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ABSTRACT
In Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), social and emotional dysfunction has been
interpreted as a secondary consequence of the broad impact of amygdala and fear circuitry
dysregulation. However, research in social neuroscience has uncovered a number of neural
systems involved in attachment and emotional regulation that may be impacted by trauma. One
example is the Default Mode Network (DMN), which is implicated in human beings’ sense of
self and ability to connect with others.
This qualitative study explored the impact of physical and emotional traumata on the
structures and functions of the DMN. The goal was to determine if dysregulation of the DMN
could account for aspects of the psychological and social dysfunction found in PTSD. This study
explored the following two questions:
1. What does the research literature tell us about the role of the DMN?
2. How does trauma impact DMN functioning?
The DMN has been associated primarily with autobiographical recall, self-referential
processing, social cognition, prospection, and moral sensitivity. The DMN appears to support
internal reflective capacity, further maintaining and connecting self-functions and social
cognition. Trauma results in internetwork rigidity, as well as overall reductions in DMN activity,
volume, and connectivity. These objective changes result in a Traumatized Resting State (TRS),
characterized by increased Salience Network connectivity and reductions in Central Executive
functioning. Studies suggest that a TRS develops in reaction to acute trauma, even before the
development of PTSD, and may continue despite the stabilization of other networks. Overall,
DMN incoherence significantly disrupts core psychosocial processes.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
It is currently estimated that the human body is composed of 37.2 trillion cells (Bianconi
et al., 2013). These cells are relationally bound, forming a web of complexity and intelligence.
Over the course of human evolution, cell activity led to differentiation, resulting in the
emergence of distinct anatomical functions. The brain is predicted to be composed of 86 billion
neurons (Herculano-Houzel, 2009). For millions of years, human brains have evolved in
adaptation to their environment. Natural selection, epigenetics, exaptation, and interacting
experiences led to the development of specialized neural systems, increasing the potential for
humans to survive, and even thrive, under precarious and often unpredictable conditions. As
brains advanced in their development, so did they give rise to a sense of self, importantly,
providing humans with the capacity to introspect, creating a window into another aspect of the
natural world, that is, the world as it is reflected in the mind. From reactive organisms guided by
instinctual impulses to thinking beings that harbor curiosity, interests, and abstract thought, the
trajectory of evolution has certainly generated features that distinguish humans from other
animals. Despite such advantages, an increase in the complexity of a system is often paralleled
by an increase in possible problems, one example being high rates of mental disorders (World
Health Organization, 2004).
The Default Mode Network
Human experience is significantly defined by the ability to retrieve memories, evaluate
present experiences, and construct imagined scenarios. Many of the distinguishing characteristics
of humans rest on their ability to view themselves as objects of their own reflection. These
metacognitive capacities provide humans with a unique opportunity to further the development
of a self, intentionally increase awareness, and improve relationships with others, therefore
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optimizing survival advantage. In fact, humans spend an estimated 46.9% of their time engaged
in such introspective processes (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010).
Marcus Raichle’s (2010) research group found only a slight decrease of the brain’s intake
of energy when resting (less than 5%). In addition, they established that approximately 60-80%
of the brain’s energy consumption is dedicated to internally directed processes, independent of
external stimuli. Elevated activations found in regions of the brain during resting state reflect a
Default Mode of brain functioning (Raichle et al., 2001), that has since been termed the Default
Mode Network (DMN).
The DMN is characterized by coherent low frequency neuronal oscillations (0.1 Hz) that
decrease during goal-directed activity, whilst returning to its frequency state during an
engagement with introspective processes (Broyd et al., 2009). Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos
(2007) postulated that this coherence is indicative of temporal synchrony between the various
regions of the brain associated with the DMN. This synchrony suggests the existence of
interconnected processes functioning in harmony.
The Default Mode Network: Function
Brain lesions, imaging, post-mortem studies, and research on psychological, psychiatric,
and neurological conditions have all contributed to compounding evidence supporting the close
relationship between neural and mental functioning (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012).
In this vein, it is logical to think that the experience of subjectivity, and the mental capacity
enabling this experience, may relate to DMN activity. In fact, the DMN has been correlated with
functions such as autobiographical recall, prospection (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009), selfreferential processing (Lanius, Bluhm, & Frewen, 2011), social cognition (Mars et al., 2012), and
moral sensitivity (Reniers et al., 2012). Understanding how these functions have been defined
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will provide deeper insight into how these fundamental processes fit together, facilitating the
overall experience of subjectivity. Moreover, such an understanding will provide the grounds to
understand how pathological processes and DMN dysfunction may lead to psychological
disarray.
Autobiographical recall refers to the process of remembering the past. According to
Spreng and colleagues (2009), reconstructing a scene from autobiographical memory requires the
projection of oneself into past memories and the retrieval of spatial and temporal information.
The ability to remember the past allows people to learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of
others. Importantly, this capacity also serves as the bedrock for the development of identity and
the formation of a coherent self.
Along with the ability to remember past events, the DMN has been found to be active
when an individual imagines the future, an ability known as prospection. Mental simulation of
several potential futures is adaptive, as it enables one to plan in advance in order to maximize the
chances of meeting a goal (Spreng et al., 2009). This capacity builds upon autobiographical
recall, utilizing one’s ability to retrieve historical information to further improve one’s current
state. Notably, imagination can be just as maladaptive as it can be adaptive, as some simulations
of the future may be negatively biased due to their contingency upon the experiences of an
individual’s history. A traumatic history may result in a form of cognitive rigidity that constricts
the application of adaptive and functional solutions. This process further promulgates anxiety
and helplessness that may have once served as a successful defense against the trauma
experienced (Cozolino, 2010).
Self-referential processing is the process of developing mental representations that are
particularly related to the self or with reference to the self (Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton,
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2012). These representations may have a positive, neutral, or negative valence. An individual’s
biological constitution and developmental experiences determine the degree to which selfreferencing and self-reflection become positive or negative experiences. Biases in cognitiveaffective SRPs will influence the organism’s behavior in its environment, resulting in adaptive or
maladaptive decision-making processes. Given the interdependent nature of such processes, a
positive or negative perception may affect one’s perception of others and ultimately one’s
interpersonal functioning (Frewen et al., 2011). Not surprisingly, a person’s capacity to be aware
of emotions is intimately connected with his/her ability to reflect on his/her own internal process
(Lanius et al., 2011). Flexibility and accuracy in social cognition are thus contingent upon the
quality of internal development, as well as the capacity for self-reflection.
In this context, social cognition has been associated with DMN functioning and may be
defined as “the perception, interpretation and processing of all information relating to a person’s
environment and relationship” (Moskowitz, as cited in Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009, p. 383).
Nietlisbach and Maercker (2009) identified four social cognitive functions necessary for
successful social interactions: theory of mind, empathy, emotional resonance, and experiences of
perceived social exclusion. Two key elements in this construct are theory of mind and empathy.
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to imagine the thoughts and feelings of others (Spreng &
Grady, 2010). ToM is cognitive (Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009) and necessitates an observer to
be capable of recognizing that another has a mind and assume what that mental state is (Saxe,
2006). Saxe (2006) emphasized another level to consider, called representational theory of mind,
which is how a mental state is represented in the other. Empathy is affective in nature
(Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009) and can be defined as a shared emotional state that emerges as a
result of the observation of and imagination about another person’s emotional state (Gallese,
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2003). ToM is subsumed in empathy (Nazarov et al., 2014). Emotional resonance is a nonconscious capacity whereby an individual automatically engages in an implicit response
(affective resonance) via detection of non-verbal communications and other social signals, made
possible by neurobiological mechanisms and circuitry dedicated to social processing (i.e., mirror
neurons, spindle cells, the DMN; Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009). With the capacity for effective
interpersonal communication, social experiences become consolidated and reflected upon
without perturbation. In contrast, perceived social exclusion from a community may have meant
death in humanity’s evolutionary history. Thus, survival may depend on the ability to detect
rejection. In fact, lacking positive relationships often leads to “loneliness, guilt, jealousy, anxiety,
and depression…higher incidences of psychopathology and have reduced immune functioning”
(Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009, p. 393).
With each interconnected function building on one another, researchers have also found
that moral decision-making recruits DMN activation (Reniers et al., 2012). Reniers and
colleagues (2012) further characterized moral decision-making as based on the internalization of
socially and societally accepted values of a particular environment, followed by the evaluation of
actions based on these values. The consistent application of these moral principles in everyday
decision-making is what Lind (2008) has termed moral judgment competency. This competency
includes the degree of alignment with certain principles and its level of integration with an
individual’s capacity to reason and act.
In unification of other DMN functions, Reniers and colleagues (2012) supported the
notion that:
The acceptability of the actions described in scenarios are based on the integration of
information about other people’s beliefs and intentions (ToM), reference to the these
peoples feelings (empathy), and reflection upon one’s own feelings, norms and values
(self-referential mental processing). (p. 203)
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Overall, Lanius and colleagues (2011) defined the DMN as a network that “aids in serving to
consolidate, stabilize and set the context for future information processing” (p. 339).
The DMN’s relationship to internal tasks further extends to mind wandering or
daydreaming. Baars (2002) introduced the Global Workspace theory, suggesting that mind
wandering really arises as input from internal and external sources attempt to gain access into the
limited capacity of a central network. According to Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and
Schooler (2009), mind wandering activates both the DMN and executive network, with
activation being at its peak when an individual is not aware of the process. They have suggested
that mind wandering may be understood as a mental state that supports cooperation between the
two networks. In this model, DMN activation is most active in effortful introspection, whereas
there are gradations of DMN and executive network activations during mind wandering and
executive network functions during a task. Notably, when the mind decides to wander, it
wanders to thoughts or feelings associated to self or others. Research by Killingsworth and
Gilbert (2010) has revealed that human mind wandering is disposed towards negativity and that
increased mind wandering is associated with lower levels of happiness.
In contrast, Smallwood and Schooler (2015) suggested that mind-wandering has also
been linked to: (a) improved capacity for delayed gratification via future planning in selfgenerated thoughts, which itself has been predictive of positive attributes such as greater
intelligence; (b) creativity or the capacity to generate novel creative thoughts, especially during
simple tasks or in daily life; (c) meaning, whereby engaging in mental time travel, particularly
thinking about specific remembered or anticipated events can enhance self-reported meaning in
life, as meaning in personal experience fosters well-being and enhances health outcomes; and
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(d) mental breaks, where mind-wandering (particularly future-oriented thoughts) has been found
to reduce undesirable mood states associated with engaging in boring task
Another salient characteristic of the DMN is its involvement with other neural networks.
More specifically, the DMN does not work in isolation; rather, it functions in relation to other
neural networks: specifically, the Salience Network (SN) and Central Executive Network (CEN).
The SN is a neural network that determines the importance of internal and external stimuli
(salience) as related to an individual’s context, further orienting an individual to internal activity
or the environment. It is composed of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, anterior
cingulate cortex (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008), amygdala, and putamen (Patel, Spreng,
Shin, & Girard, 2012). The CEN is activated when the brain is engaged in a task, and its central
nodes are the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex (Sridharan et al., 2008).
The SN has been found to be responsible for transitioning between the DMN and the CEN
(Goulden et al., 2014). Anticevic and colleagues (2012) defined the DMN as a constellation of
areas in the brain anti-correlated to fronto-parietal regions, further labeling the DMN as a task
negative network (TNN) in contrast to a task positive network (TPN), as the DMN deactivates
when one is engaged in an external task. This notion however, has been found to be incorrect, as
tasks involving self and social processes have been found to activate the DMN (Mars et al.,
2012).
Notably, there is a commonality underlying every function that has been associated with
the DMN: namely, its underlying role as a bridge to internal reflective capacity, the capacity for
which has been found to connect self and social processes. Thus, it is a network dedicated to
bridging others and the self (BOATS), both experientially and functionally.
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The Default Mode Network: Structure
Areas composing the DMN include the medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC), the precuneus
(Raichle et al., 2001), lateral parietal and temporal cortices (Spreng et al., 2009), and the
Cingulate Cortex (primarily PCC; Buckner, Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). A more extensive list can
be viewed in Figure 1.
The mPFC is a central node in the DMN, having among the highest baseline metabolic
activity at rest (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001). In addition, it has dense
connections to the limbic system and has been found to be involved with monitoring and
modulating emotions arising from these regions. Some models suggest divisions in the mPFC
that correspond to conceptual and embodied self-awareness (Lanius et al., 2011). The ventral
mPFC (vmPFC) is seen as a key player for embodied self-awareness, whereas the dorsal mPFC
(dmPFC) has been connected with conceptual awareness. Lanius and colleagues (2011) defined
conceptual emotional awareness as a linguistic and rational process that enables reflection,
interpretation, and decision-making in relation to an embodied emotion or sensation. In contrast,
embodied emotional/self-awareness is intuitive; “based on sensing, feeling and acting, [it] tends
to be spontaneous and creative and is usually lived in the present moment” (p. 333). In relation,
Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio (2000) described the vmPFC as “a repository of dispositionally
recorded linkages between factual knowledge and bioregulatory states” (p. 296). In a metaanalytic study, Etkin and Wager (2007) discovered that in relation to other anxiety disorders,
diminished vmPFC activation is unique to PTSD. They also viewed the vmPFC as playing an
integral role to the Somatic Marker hypothesis, which describes decision-making as a “process
that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory processes” (p. 295).
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Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 2
Bilateral inferior parietal and posterior temporal around the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 5
Hippocampal formation 2, 4
Inferior parietal lobule 2, 7
Insula 7
Lateral parietal cortices 1, 4, 7
Lateral temporal lobes 7
Medial posterior cortex 5
Medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC) 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7
Middle temporal gyrus 3
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)1, 2, 4, 5, 6
Precuneus 1, 5, 6
Thalamus 7
References
1) Bianconi et al., 2013
2) Buckner et al., 2008
3) Daniels, Bluhm, & Lanius, 2013
4) Fair et al., 2008
5) Mars et al., 2012
6) Raichle et al., 2001
7) Spreng et al., 2009

Figure 1. The Default Mode Network: Associated regions.
As a convergence zone for self and emotionally based information, decreases in vmPFC
activation are indicative of irregularities in potential higher-order intuitive states. Interestingly,
researchers have also associated vmPFC to self-referential cognition, and the dmPFC when
forming impressions about others; however, it is “more akin to a gradient than a true functional
dissociation” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 455). It has been associated with information processing
relevant to the self and considering the minds of other people (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae,
2005).
The parietal lobes emerged evolutionarily from the hippocampus (Cozolino, 2010), and
are related to somatosensory perception, bodily perception, visual-spatial orientation, memory,
symbolic synthesis, and cross-modal matching (Beaumont, 2008). As such, the parietal cortices
are necessary for creating internal maps of the environment and the self in relation to the
environment. The parietal lobes may well be supporting mPFC-mediated self-related processes
with an imaginary self upon which to reflect.
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Two studies (Buccione, Fadda, Serra, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2008; Kapur, Ellison,
Smith, McLellan, & Burrows, 1992) found that bilateral lesions in the temporal lobes play a
significant role in memory for past events, affecting both autobiographical (i.e., episodic,
semantic) and non-autobiographical (i.e., public events, general semantic knowledge) memory.
In addition to the mPFC and parietal cortices, the bilateral temporal lobes appear to provide
context to this formation of self.
Ablation studies have found that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) contributes to the
brain’s ability to detect and correct errors, regulating both cognitive and emotional processing
(Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). This region, though associated to DMN functioning in some
studies, has been increasingly understood as a central component in the SN. In contrast, the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) has been implicated in evaluative functions and mediation of
interactions of emotional and memory-related processes (Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore,
2003). In conjunction with the mPFC, parietal cortices, and temporal lobes, the cingulate gyrus
functions as a primer for current and future social engagement. Overall, the PCC has been related
to DMN functioning in more studies, and as such will be understood as a primary node.
A meta-analytic review of studies of the precuneus suggests that activations in this region
are involved in mental imagery strategies related to the self, facilitation of successful episodic
memory retrieval (Cavanna & Trible, 2006), and the integration of mental images (D’Angiulli et
al., 2013). In coordination with previously implicated regions, these regions provide for an
autobiographically constructed process localized in the imaginal and physical world that must
adapt constantly to information being received from the environment.
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Table 1
The Default Mode Network: Associated Regions and Functions
Region
Medial prefrontal cortex (Mitchell et al.,
2005)
Parietal lobes (Beaumont, 2008)

Function
Information processing relevant to self and
considering the minds of other people
Somatosensory perception, bodily perception,
visual-spatial orientation, memory, symbolic
synthesis, and cross-modal matching
Temporal lobes (Buccione et al., 2008;
Role in memory for past events, affecting both
Kapur et al., 1992)
autobiographical (i.e., episodic, semantic) and
non-autobiographical (i.e., public events, general
semantic knowledge) memory.
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (Bush et al.,
Detect and correct errors, regulating both cognitive
2000)
and emotional processing
Posterior Cingulate Cortex (Maddock et al., Evaluative functions and mediation of interactions
2003)
of emotional and memory-related processes
Precuneus (Cavanna & Trible, 2006),
Mental imagery strategies related to the self,
facilitation of successful episodic memory
retrieval
Temporo-parietal Junction (Saxe, 2006)
Theory of mind, empathy
Li, Mai, and Liu (2014) conducted a meta-analysis on the DMN, encountering three main
subsystems thereof: the vmPFC in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, critically
involved with processing emotional features; the anterior mPFC and PCC, responsible for the
elaboration of the experiential feelings of self; and the dmPFC and the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), central to ToM (mentalizing) and morality. The PCC was also found to be a central node
involved with explicit emotional engagement, emotional word processing, face perception,
implicit emotional engagement during self-directed attention or evaluation, and autobiographical
memory. The role of the mPFC was found to be critical in all of the studies, supporting the
simulation theory, stating that humans’ social cognitive functions are contingent upon past
experiences, which serve as a platform for understanding others. It was also indicated that mPFC
activation increases with the complexity of tasks performed, with this complexity also
manifesting in activations higher up in the frontal cortex. This finding potentially reflects a
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bottom-up process, where non-conscious, effortless information processing emerges into
effortful cognitive processing.
Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, and Buckner (2010) yielded similar findings,
encountering two distinct systems. They labeled the first subsystem the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex subsystem, including the dmPFC, TPJ, lateral temporal cortex, and temporal pole. The
second subsystem they called the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, which includes the
vmPFC, posterior inferior parietal lobule, retrospelenial cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and
hippocampal formation. They discovered selective activation within these networks when
engaging in different tasks. The dmPFC subsystem was preferentially activated when individuals
were making self-referential judgments about a present situation. In contrast, the MTL was
engaged during episodic judgments about personal future.
At the neuronal level, the DMN contains Von Economo Neurons or Spindle cells, which
are found in the ACC, anterior insula, and areas of the prefrontal lobes. Anatomically, they are
found linking each one of these areas together and also extend, connecting with the amygdala,
thalamus, hypothalamus, and periaqueductal gray matter. To this day, they have only been found
in large-brained social mammals (Cozolino, 2014). It is hypothesized that they are an “obligatory
neuronal adaptation in very large brains, permitting fast information processing and transfer
along highly specific projections and that evolved in relation to emerging social behaviors in
select groups of mammals” (Butti, Sherwood, Hakeem, Allman, & Hof, 2009, p. 254). Mirror
neurons have also been found in areas associated to the DMN: more specifically, the inferior
frontal gyrus (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009) and rostral region of the right
superior parietal lobule (Iacoboni et al., 1999). Mirror neurons are activated while observing
another individual performing an action, and when one performs the action. In a TED talk, V. S.
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Ramachandran (2009) called them “Gandhi neurons or empathy neurons” (5:56). He also
discussed how mirror neurons allowed for a “Lamarckian evolution” (3:51), as they enable one
to imitate and emulate others, learning a skill that would usually take years, or even generations,
in a matter of minutes.
Situated in convergence zones of higher order motor, visual, and emotional processing,
mirror neurons have the unique advantage of being activated during both observation and action
(Cross & Iacoboni, 2013). Incorporated in these systems are blueprints of others as well as the
internal maps of the spaces we inhabit. Somatic experiences, survival needs, and strategies for
goal achievement are also embedded in these systems (Cozolino, 2014).
Over the last twenty years, mirror systems have helped us to understand how our brains
link together in the synchronization of such group behaviors as hunting, dancing, and
emotional attunement. They are most likely involved in the learning of manual skills, the
evolution of gestural communication, spoken language, group cohesion, and empathy.
(Jeannerod, as cited in Cozolino, 2014, p. 147)
It would be interesting to determine whether Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) results in
irregularities within the cytoarchitecture of one or both of these types of neurons.
The Development of the DMN
From a developmental standpoint, it is interesting to note that during infancy (up to 2
years), humans lack a sense of self. Though a self may have been developing during that time,
with experiences becoming embedded into implicit memory systems, a stable and continuous
sense of self capable of introspection simply does not exist during early infancy. As time goes
on, the brain develops in interaction with its social environment, giving rise to a sense of self.
Thus, humans “seem to emerge into self-awareness from an undifferentiated sense of
membership and interrelationship with family and community” (Cozolino, 2014, p. 258).
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It is estimated that self-recognition begins around the age of 2 (Rochat, 2003), which
parallels the approximation of the beginning of explicit memory (Siegler, 1998). Following these
milestones arises ToM, beginning at approximately 3 years of age, with representational ToM
arising around 5 years of age (Saxe, 2006). Self-concept, in contrast, has been estimated to
develop only around the ages of 7-8 (Leflot, Onghena, & Colpin, 2010). As self and social
processes develop alongside each other, so are these experiences embedded in the DMN. These
two seemingly independent constructs appear to be only separated by humans’ necessity to
categorize, as through the lens of the DMN, self and social processes are bound.
With this context in mind, it is interesting to note that the DMN has been found to
stabilize by the ages of 9-12 (Thomason et al., 2008). Thomason and colleagues (2008)
concluded that anterior-posterior integration of a 9-year-old was comparable to adult levels and
that 7-9 year olds’ levels remained significantly different. Through convergent structural and
functional connectivity analyses, Supekar and colleagues (2010) demonstrated immature
connectivity between the PCC-mPFC along the cingulum, a bundle of white matter fibers
projecting from the cingulate gyrus to the entorhinal cortex1, allowing communication with the
limbic system. This may be reflected in immaturity in one of the DMN’s subsystems related to
self-referential processing (Li et al., 2014). In some cases, they encountered non-existent to weak
PCC-left MTL connectivity in second and third graders (7-9 years old). It is interesting to note
that only between the ages of 8-13 do children begin to develop a mature grasp of delayed
gratification. This includes the cognitive ability to inhibit arousing thoughts by employing
abstract strategies to attain a greater reward in the future (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1992).
These findings echo the growth of metacognitive capacity, allowing for the differentiation and
1

Resides between the hippocampus and mPFC, highly connected to the limbic system (Lindemer, Salat, Leritz,
McGlinchey, & Milberg, 2013)
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development of a stable sense of self. It is possible that around the age of 7, there is an
emergence and subsequent acquisition of a wider range of self and social capacities, and it is not
until the age of 8 and beyond that these functions begin to take form and stabilize, which is
reflected in DMN functioning.
Socio-emotional Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
If necessity is the mother of invention, then evolution itself has created the necessity for
psychotherapy by shaping a brain that is vulnerable to a wide array of difficulties.
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 305)
One diagnosis that is in dire need of further understanding in order to improve treatment
is PTSD, currently characterized by intrusions, avoidance, arousal, and negative mood and
cognitions (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). In this context, dysfunctional
interpersonal relationships have been understood as a secondary consequence of PTSD, yet many
individuals with PTSD have been shown to exhibit violence (Galovsky & Lyons, 2004), abusive
behaviors (Stinson, Becker, & Sales, 2008; Thomas et al., 2013), relational difficulties (Galovsky
& Lyons, 2004; Maercker & Horn, 2012), and an increased chance of suicide (Stevens et al.,
2013).
Similar to understanding neuroanatomical functions through brain lesions, the function of
brain networks can be understood by examining how alterations in functional connectivity affect
corresponding psychological processes. Given the associated functions of the DMN, significant
increases and decreases in activity and connectivity within and between DMN regions may
hinder an individual’s ability to relate to himself/herself and others. Confluences of
dysfunctional psychological processes are likely mirrored in the neural incoherence encountered
in DMN studies.
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Purpose and Importance of this Study
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (n.d.), 3.5% of U.S. adults suffer
from PTSD, which is approximately 1.3% of the U.S population. This percentage is equivalent to
around 40 million people; 36.6% of these cases are classified as severe. Such a high prevalence
rate, in conjunction with difficulties in this demographic, are forcing researchers and clinicians to
look beyond the confines of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (APA, 2013) for more
comprehensive ways to diagnose and treat these serious and chronic consequences. This study
sought to examine extant literature on PTSD and social neuroscience to determine how deficits
in the DMN may contribute to post-traumatic symptomology.
Research Questions
This study focused on the following research questions:
1. What does the research literature tell us about the role of the DMN?
2. How does trauma impact DMN functioning?
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Procedures
Studies were identified from seven databases: Science Direct, Frontiers, Wiley, Google
Scholar, Psych articles, Pubmed, and Psychinfo. These databases were used to facilitate a
comprehensive collection of empirically reviewed psychological and biomedical articles related
to the field of study. Articles and texts were selected based on degree of relevancy to (a) the
structure and function of the DMN, (b) the impact of PTSD on the DMN, (c) the relationship
between the DMN and social functioning, and (d) the impact of PTSD on social functioning.
Moreover, text selection included seminal reviews that have been recognized in the field.
Inclusion criteria for article selection were subject dependent. Literature on the DMN
published from January 2001 through July 2014 was identified. Due to its formal introduction
into the literature as the Default Mode by Raichle and colleagues in 2001, only a relatively small
number of existing studies could be identified. As such, related articles within this time period
were considered for this review. Within the research studies, subjects’ ages ranged from college
students to a geriatric demographic, with the exception of one article that tracked the
development of the DMN throughout the lifespan (Fair et al., 2008)
Articles on neurobiology, PTSD, and social functioning published from January 1992 to
July 2014 were identified. According to Huetell, Song, and McCarthy (2008), 1992 was the first
year when studies used Blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrasts and comparable
technologies, procedures, and techniques to current fMRI studies. Selected studies focused on
experiments that used human subjects.
The researcher employed a search strategy to identify independent and/or matched
articles with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the Default Mode Network (DMN), self,
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social functioning, and relationships as main headings or text words embedded in abstracts.
Relevant citations from studies were also included in this review.
In sum, 127 articles were used. Twenty-six articles were utilized to define and determine
the structure and function of the DMN. A total of 36 research studies were identified
investigating the impact of trauma on the resting state, 27 of which directly investigated PTSD
and the DMN. Overall, the entire sample size consisted of an experimental group of 813
individuals either exposed to trauma or actively diagnosed with PTSD, compared with a control
group of 697. Research studies particular to the DMN and PTSD resulted in an experimental
group of 511 compared with a control group of 456. In conjunction, 23 studies related to DMN
functions and 18 reviews on PTSD, the brain, and self/social functioning were integrated. An
additional 39 supportive articles were included to provide background information on topics of
review. Non-electronic sources included 11 published texts.
This study will begin by operationalizing the concept of self. It will subsequently discuss
how the DMN relates to self-functions and the impact of PTSD on these processes. Successively,
there will be an examination of the DMN’s involvement with social processes. Methodological
limitations will ensue, followed by a conclusion, clinical implications, and discussion/directions
for future research.
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Chapter 3: The Effects of PTSD on the Default Mode Network
Patients with PTSD are embedded in a distorted perceptual reality. Intrusions of
unwanted memories, chaotic affective experiences, unmanageable impulses, and unpleasant
somatic sensations all contribute to a world molded by trauma. Importantly, the manifestations of
dysregulation go beyond visible symptoms, extending into processes of self and others. This
phenomenon is most evident among individuals who have experienced attachment-based trauma
as a result of chronic neglect or abuse from parents, whereby an identity forms from the
relational patterns that have been sculpted into implicit neural networks through years of
interactions. Biases in self and social cognition emerge, mirroring one’s relationship with one’s
caregivers. Importantly, successive misattunements and ruptures without reconciliation may then
lead to isolation, further exacerbating PTSD. But what of individuals who become diagnosed
with PTSD later in life? Is it possible for traumatic experiences to become internalized and
represented in such a way that they trump prior relational patterns, resulting in the deterioration
of core systems that define the self? The answer to this question seems to lie in the DMN.
The Default Mode Network and Self
Posteromedial cortices possibly [reflect] the background-foreground dance played by the
self within the conscious mind. When we need to attend to external stimuli, our conscious
mind brings the object under scrutiny into the foreground and lets the self retreat into the
background. (Damasio, 2010, p. 243)
The self has long been a subject of discussion among philosophers and psychologists
alike. Currently, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the self as “a person’s essential being
that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or
reflexive action” (“Self,” n.d., para. 1). The father of Self Psychology, Heinz Kohut (as cited in
Bromberg, 2014), defined self as the “independent center of initiative” (p. 3,038). Others, such as
William James (1890/2012), believed the self to encompass everything that an individual is, as
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well as everything associated to them (i.e., house, yacht). Still some eastern philosophies
consider the conscious self to be Maya, or an illusion (Cozolino, 2010).
The self remains a highly controversial topic. In this review, the self will be defined as
the sum total of conscious and non-conscious processes in an organism. With influence from
Kohut (as cited in Bromberg, 2014) and Wolf (Kohut & Wolf, 1978), the sense of self will be
defined as the capacity to experience the process of existing with continuity and stability through
time. This is an important distinction, considering that an individual’s self is very different from
having the capacity to sense (or become aware of) that self. This study will also follow Northoff
and Bermpohl’s (2004) conceptualization of self-functions, which is further divided into 12
domains. These include the following (see Table 2).
Table 2
Self-related Functions
Function
Representation
Monitoring
Evaluation
Integration
Self-Awareness
Unity
Agency
Spatial Perspectivity
Ownership
Mind-Reading
Emotion
Autobiographical memory

Description
Labeling of stimuli as self-referential
Monitoring self referential stimuli
Judgment of self-referential stimuli
Linkage of stimuli to the personal context
Awareness and recognition of the own face/body
Experience of self as a unit
Feeling of being causally involved in an action
Location of the self in space
Perceptions of body and environment as self-related
Covert mimicking of others mental states
Convergence/experience of intero- and exteroceptive stimuli
Integration of stimuli in personal context

In this conceptualization, the DMN supports all of these functions (Cozolino, 2010;
Lanius et al., 2011; Mars et al., 2012; Reniers et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2009). As such, the
DMN can be understood as a network that maintains an internal sense of self. The emergence of
this sense hinges on a reflective capacity, in addition to initial social encounters and the ability to
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remember one’s past (i.e., autobiographical recall). As time passes, experiences are consolidated
into identity (i.e., self-referential processing). Currently, it is hypothesized that self-conception is
developed by a continuity of self-judgments relayed from observation and memory (Wagner et
al., 2012). A natural increase in an individual’s social network inevitably leads to more complex
relationships. Higher order socialization (i.e., empathy) evolves with development, relaying back
in the molding of identity. Humans develop a sense of morality based on their biological
disposition, upbringing, psychosocial experiences, and levels of societal adjustment.
The development of a neural network dedicated to internal experience does beg the
question, What is the evolutionary importance of having a sense of self? One hypothesis is that a
sense of self, as reflected in the DMN, may aid in a process of differentiation and individuation
in the context of a social environment. The evolutionary advantage of this process may be found
in creative adaptation and the diversification of gene functioning (i.e., epigenetics). Increased
reflective capacity may also facilitate the process of learning and enhance executive functioning
(Taylor et al., 2012). An inability to learn from experience and engage reactively with the
environment would likely be disadvantageous to survival. Understanding these benefits, two
questions come to mind: (a) How does trauma impact DMN functioning? and (b) How is this
reflected psychologically?
PTSD has been observed among combat veterans, survivors of sexual/physical/emotional
abuse, and victims of natural disasters, accidents (i.e., car crashes), and other medical
complications. It would be unjust to generalize symptomology across all subtypes; however,
commonalities in patterns of negative cognition have been observed among all these populations.
Such cognitions include self-blame, biased or otherwise incorrect views on the causes or
consequences of a traumatic event, the belief that they are vulnerable or insufficient, and/or
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identification with an unalterable belief that they have changed for the worse. This consistent
finding gave rise to a fourth symptom cluster, negative alterations in cognitions and mood, which
emerged in the DSM-5. This new cluster, Criterion D, included symptoms C3-7 from the DSMIV-TR with two new additions: “Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations
about oneself, others, or the world” and “Pervasive negative emotional state” (APA, 2013,
p. 272).
Indeed, statements many PTSD victims endorse or report experiencing such sentiments
as: “I am a bad person,” “Nothing good can happen to me,” and “I can never trust again”
(Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 2011, p. 759): all suggestive that a core aspect of self has
been threatened. These negative cognitions are often accompanied by emotions including fear,
helplessness, and horror, as well as self-states of anger, guilt, and shame (Friedman et al., 2011).
Put together, these psychological symptoms suggest that victims’ identity and continuity of self
have been compromised.
It comes without surprise that such pervasive spirals of negative affect and cognition are
mirrored in neural networks. In the context of this study, symptoms of DMN dysregulation
surface as victims develop intrusive memories, extreme sensitivity to arousal, and distortions in
self and social processes. The disintegration of the DMN imprisons PTSD victims within the
echoes of traumatic experience, as they are unable to escape the rigidity of a disposition that was
once beneficial to their survival.
Table 2 demonstrates irregularities in resting state functioning (grouped by findings)
correlated with PTSD. Overall, the most salient pattern is coupling between the DMN and
Salience Network (SN), with corresponding decreases in Central Executive Network (CEN)
functioning. This seems to be a signature of trauma. Remarkably, this signature was also found
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among children (Suo et al., 2015). The relational connections amongst the processes of
introspection (DMN), orientation (to environmental or internal variables, SN), and engagement
on a particular task (CEN) are thus disrupted in PTSD, giving rise to a Traumatized Resting State
(TRS). This merger network likely contributes to symptoms of hyperarousal, whereby
traumatization results in an inherent focus on environmental threat detection (Tursich et al.,
2015; Zhang et al., 2015). Functionally, the emergence of a TRS may be adaptive in a dangerous
environment, as it maintains a higher level of orientation to the detection of salience as its
default. Increased orientation may serve a protective factor, helping individuals become more
vigilant about their surroundings in search of potential danger. Consequently, biases in detecting
salient variables will likely distort an individual’s self-awareness and ability to accurately
monitor internal reactions. Perhaps this experience may have contributed to the emergence of the
saying sleeping with one eye open.
Table 3
Impact of Trauma and PTSD on the Default Mode Network
Study
Patel et al.
(2012)

Lei et al.
(2015)

Demographic
Review (13 studies, PTSD on
DMN)
PTSD vs. Non-Trauma
145 = PTSD
Control = 193

76 PTSD via earthquake, 76
trauma exposed

Findings
Reliable increases
R Fusiform gyrus
R Insula (SN)
R Hippocampus (DMN)
L Precuneus (CEN)
L Amygdala (SN)
L Putamen (SN)
R Post-central Gyrus
L Anterior Insula (SN)
R Middle frontal gyrus (CEN)
Reliable decreases:
Left angular Gyrus (DMN)
L rostral Anterior Cingulate
L Precentral gyrus
R Posterior Cingulate (DMN)
R medial frontal gyrus (DMN)
L Rostral anterior Cingulate
R Precentral gyrus
R Caudate (CEN)
L Supramarginal gyrus (CEN)
L Middle frontal gyrus (CEN)
Increased centrality of nodes predominately
involved in DMN and SN (including PCC,
precuneus, insula, putamen, pallidum, and
temporal regions)

Potential Implications
Increased cross talk with network dedicated
to internal/environmental orientation SN.
Decreases in CEN dedicated to executive
functions. Decreases throughout DMN.
Overall dysregulation across networks.
Dysregulation of core self and social
functions.

Increased disposition towards salience
detection. Dysregulation of core self and
social functions.
(continued)
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Study
Long et al.
(2013)

Demographic
17 survivors of motor vehicle
accidents (MVA)

Findings
Enhanced nodal centralities in the SN and
decreased centralities in the medial orbital
frontal cortex.

Potential Implications
Increased vigilance, decreased self/social
processes.

Zhang et al.
(2015)

20 PTSD patients (MVA) 20
healthy matched

Sig decreased network connectivity in
aDMN, pDMN SN, sensory motor network
and auditory network, Furthermore,
increased in SN and pDMN connectivity.

Dunkley et
al. (2015)

21 PTSD veterans
27 trauma exposed

PTSD group had increased interconnectivity
between DMN and ventral attention network
and SN

Suo et al.
(2015)

28 pediatric PTSD patients
26 trauma-exposed non-PTSD

Enhanced nodal centralities in DMN and SN
and reduced in CEN.

Increased disposition towards salience
detection. Dysregulation of core self and
social functions.Heightened anxiety and
hyperarousal. pDMN involved more with
orienting self to space, emotion-memory, and
decision making.
Increased disposition towards salience
detection. Dysregulation of core self and
social functions. Heightened anxiety and
hyperarousal.
Increased cross talk with network dedicated
to environmental orientation SN. Decreased
self/social and executive functioning.

Shang et al.
(2014)

18 PTSD earthquake
20 healthy survivors

Chung et al.
(2006)

23 PTSD patients
18 MVA
3 DV
2 physical assault
64 healthy controls

Increased and decreased functional
connectivity within SN, DMN, CEN,
somato-motor network (SMN), auditory
network (AN) and visual network (VN)
Increased cerebral blood flow in limbic
regions and decreased blood flow in frontal
gyrus, parietal, and temporal regions in
comparison to the control group

PTSD patients showed widespread deficits in
low-level perceptual and higher-order
cognitive network. PTSD as a complex
network based disorder
Interference from SN, lack of ability to
inhibit, plan and organize. Engagement in
emotional reasoning.

Yan et al.
(2013)

52 Veterans diagnosed with
PTSD
52 control group veterans

Increased spontaneous activity in amygdala,
ventral anterior cingulate cortex, insula and
orbital frontal cortex, decreased activity in
precuneus, DLPFC, and thalamus

Failure of frontal inhibition of amygdala.
Intrusion of SN into DMN. Increased
disposition towards salience detection.
decreased capacity for self/social processes

Jin et al.
(2014)

72 PTSD earthquake
86 Trauma exposed non-PTSD

Failure of frontal inhibition of amygdala.
Intrusion of SN into DMN. Increased
disposition towards salience detection.
decreased capacity for self/social processes

Sripada et al.
(2012)

15 returning male veterans
diagnosed with PTSD
14 combat controls

Weaker positive connectivity between mPFC
and amygdala, hippocampus,
parahippocampal gyrus and rectus. As well
as inferior OFC and hippocampus. PTSD
patients also show stronger negative
connectivity between PCC and insula.
CAPS scores in PTSD patients had a
negative correlation with connectivity
between amygdala and mPFC.
Positive connectivity between amygdala and
insula. Reduced connectivity between the
amygdala and hippocampus.
Anti-correlation between the amygdala and
dorsal/rostral areas of the ACC.
Less activation and coherence in overall
DMN and an increase in the activation of the
SN.
Increased cross-network connectivity
between the DMN and SN.

Lui et al.
(2009)

44 survivors natural disaster
(earthquake 8.0)
32 control
Acute - 25 days post

Decreased DMN integration, reduced
temporal synchronization. Functional
disconnections among the limbic-striatal and
DMN. Hyperactivity in prefrontal-limbic and
striatal brain systems and pre-supplementary
motor area

Dissociation between intensely feared
memories and the ability for
autobiographical memory to contextualize
and regulate them.
May contribute to flashbacks and an inability
to control undesirable memories.
Impairment in logical thinking in arousing
situations. Errors and rewards may be
overlooked due to the irregularities of their
emotional responses
Increased disposition towards salience
detection. decreased capacity for self/social
processes.
Biases in episodic memory, emotional
processing, decision-making.

(continued)
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Study
Bonne et al.
(2003)

Demographic
28 civilian trauma (most
MVA) survivors (11 with
PTSD)
Acute 6 months after trauma

Kemp et al.
(2010)

14 victims of PTSD
15 individuals with Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD)
15 healthy
Combat victims 22 veterans
with PTSD
18 Combat Exposure
13 Control Group (healthy
civilian)

DiGangi et
al. (2016)

Findings
PTSD : Regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF)
higher in cerebellum and right precentral,
superior temporal and fusiform gyrus.
Cerebellar and extrastriate rCBF positive
correlate with depression and PTSD
symptoms.
Cortisol level in PTSD negative correlation
with medial temporal lobe perfusion.
ACC perfusion and cortisol positively related
to PTSD but negative in trauma survivors
w/o PTSD.
Positive correlation between PTSD severity
and right-frontal lateralization. Greater
activity in PTSD vs. MDD in rightparietotemporal regions
Both PTSD and trauma exposed samples
exhibited weaker connectivity within a
network involving the precuneus, medial
prefrontal cortex and right superior parietal
lobule.

Potential Implications
Focus on survival and increased intrusions of
SN, threat detection. Increased detection for
error correction resulting in cortisol spike in
PTSD sample.

PTSD symptoms associated with
connectivity of PCC/precuneus with
perigenual ACC and right amygdala.
PCC negatively correlated with CAPS
(Clinician Administered PTSD Scale) scores
in right hippocampus, right amygdala and
left superior temporal gyrus,. Strength of
connectivity between PCC and bilateral
amygdala, and even between bilateral
amygdala predicts severity of PTSD
symptoms

DMN connectivity was predictive of future
PTSD symptoms. Merger of SN into selfprocesses Right amygdala shift.
DMN connectivity predictive of future PTSD
Symptoms. Right amygdala shift.

Emotionality and difficulties with selfregulation
Biases in self-referential processes and
mental strategies related to self, reduced
episodic memory retrieval

Lanius et al.
(2010)

11 subjects MVA
Acute trauma 6-12 weeks

Zhou et al.
(2012)

15 PTSD victims MVA
Acute 2 days post fMRI all
developed PTSD

Bluhm et al.
(2009)

17 female victims of PTSD
(Chronic early-life trauma)
and 15 healthy controls.

Reduced functional connectivity of PCC
with precuneus, mPFC and bilateral parietal
cortex in PTSD relative to controls

Disturbances in self-referential processing,
and social cognition.

Qin et al.
(2012)

62 victims of motor vehicle
accidents with PTSD (22
victims dx with PTSD)
19 control group - Acute 2days post traumatic incident

Trauma: decreased functional connectivity in
right lingual and right middle temporal gyri
and PCC. Decreased PCC and mPFC
connectivity predictive of higher CAPS
scores

Disturbances in self-referential processing,
increased emotional dysregulation, reduced
interoception.

Increases in right middle temporal gyrus,
insula, right medial frontal gyrus and left
ACC and left inferior temporal gyrus,
Reduced left hippocampal volume

Zhang et al.
(2011)

10 Natural disaster victims
with PTSD, 10 without

Decreased capacity for consolidation, and
hippocampus to regulate limbic activity.

Kim et al.
(2012)
Bremner et
al. (1997)

12 Sexual assault victims with
PTSD
17 Survivors of child abuse,
17 healthy subjects

Reduced left hippocampal perfusion and
activity
12% smaller left hippocampal volume

Decreased capacity for a victim of PTSD to
remember details of a trauma

Bing et al.
(2013)

20 PTSD (MVA)
20 controls

Reduction volume of anterior PFC, inferior
frontal gyrus, dorsal ACC, and right superior
temporal gyrus in PTSD.

Decreased volume and increased amplitude
low frequency fluctuations in aPFC, and
dACC were associated with PTSD severity

Decrease in dorsolateral prefrontal cortical
(dlPFC) activations

Inability to inhibit unwanted memories

Increased activation in the right anterior
insula
Positive connectivity between the insula and
amygdala

Poor interoception and processing of
negative emotions.
Fight/flight bodily responses in an
environment that no longer requires such
adaptive measures.
(continued)
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Study
Yin et al.
(2011)

Demographic
72 PTSD diagnosis
86 Non-PTSD
EQ 8 months into event

Findings
Right hemisphere lateralization
Decreases in right insula, visual cortex,
cerebellum
Overactivation in right frontal regions.
Ventral mPFC, DLPFC.

Tursich et al.
(2015)

21 victims dx with PTSD
(childhood trauma)

Potential Implications
Alterations in emotions and processing and
integration of trauma recall
Aberrant encoding retrieval of episodic
memory and complex verbal working
memory.
Depression, anxiety autonomic arousal

Decreased connectivity left posterior insula
and superior temporal gyrus within SN.

Increased hyperarousal symptoms

Reduced connectivity in DMN (perigenual
anterior cingulate and vmPFC). Reduced
synchrony between dorsal anterior and
posterior DMN components and between
right CEN and ventral anterior DMN

Depersonalization/derealization

Failure to deactivate associated DMN
regions when attempting to engage in a
working memory task, resulting in reduced
attentional lapses and decrements in
performance
Long-term changes occur in core aspects of
self-processing, cognitive and emotional
functioning – independent of anxiety sx.
Increase risk of PTSD development

Daniels et al.
(2010)

12 individuals with severe,
chronic PTSD and 12 controls

During working memory task, enhanced
connectivity between the PCC and right
superior frontal gyrus, as well as between the
mPFC and left parahippocampal gyrus.

Du et al.
(2015)

21 survivors of earthquake, 21
healthy controls

3 weeks post-disaster: frontal-limbic-striatal
and DMN had functional connectivity
changes. 2 year follow-up only changes in
DMN persisted despite recovery from high
initial levels of anxiety

Unfortunately, this hypervigilance becomes maladaptive in a safe environment.
Generalization of salience detection likely raises the probability of fear-based responses in any
situation that presents with ambiguity. Similar to the perceptual filling of the blind spot caused
by the optic nerve, the brain’s adaptive nature provides biased, survival-based responses that are
inherently resistant to change. The result is an inability to remain calm in the presence of
misinformed anticipated danger. This sense of impending doom prevents victims of PTSD from
feeling safe enough to engage in accurate self-based processes that may very well help them to
re-stabilize their DMN.
Interestingly, PTSD victims experience contradictory signals to focus on the environment
during moments of introspection, with this process being reversed during moments requiring full
engagement with the environment. Daniels and colleagues (2010) conducted an experiment with
12 individuals with severe, chronic PTSD and 12 controls, finding that individuals with PTSD
had enhanced connectivity between the PCC and right superior frontal gyrus, as well as between
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the mPFC and left parahippocampal gyrus. Individuals with PTSD consistently failed to
deactivate these associated DMN regions when attempting to engage in a working memory task,
resulting in reduced cognitive performance. Furthermore, they reviewed three additional studies,
all of which supported their conclusions, demonstrating that the inability to deactivate the DMN
during tasks led to “decreased activity in task-related regions, attentional lapses and decrements
in performance” (p. 264). In sum, the SN interferes with DMN functioning during moments of
reflection, while the DMN becomes the source of interference during moments requiring the
CEN.
In extension, a review of Table 3 demonstrates reductions in connectivity between frontal
systems and the amygdala (a central subcortical structure part of the SN). This is compounded by
hypoactive activity in frontal regions and hyperactive limbic activity, with a consequent decline
in CEN functioning. This finding is consistent with the overall neuropsychological profile of
PTSD victims. Vasterling and Brailey (2005) noted that:
Cognitive deficits are not global but are limited to specific domains, in particular
attention and memory functions. Within these domains aspects of attention and memory
dependent on executive controls (inhibition, working memory, initial acquisition,
freedom from sensitivity to distraction and interference) appear to be especially
vulnerable in PTSD. (p. 199)
Of note, the orbitofrontal cortex is highly sensitive to abnormalities in the serotonergic and
noradrenergic neurotransmitter systems. Cognitive impairment observed in emotionally neutral
tasks in PTSD is thought to be associated with these former systems, which are highly involved
in regulation of arousal, as it is richly connected to both the amygdala and hippocampus
(Vasterling & Brailey, 2005).
It is interesting to note one study (Zhang et al., 2015) that specified increases in
connectivity between the SN and posterior DMN, alongside several sensory circuits. The
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posterior DMN involves regions associated with orienting oneself in space, emotion-memory,
and decision-making (Kilpatrick et al., 2015). This is a logical conclusion, given that the
demographic was composed of motor vehicle accident (MVA) victims. Hypervigilance seems to
have emerged in alignment with the specific trauma, perhaps the brain’s best defense in
preventing another accident.
In sum, when affected individuals are in a resting state, they maintain a focus on potential
threats, and when attempting to focus on a task, they are unable to inhibit self-states reflective of
threat-detection, negative cognition, and emotionality. Psychologically, this implies the
preservation of a rigid and active defense mechanism that was adaptive during threatening
situations, yet is no longer applicable. Importantly, this manifestation is partially accounted for
and maintained by impairments in cognition. Conflicting signals between self-environment
interactions may further lead to isolation and cognitive dissonance, where thoughts, feelings, and
actions lead to incongruous states of being, ending with a loss of agency.
A third pattern concerns disruptions in DMN regions highly related to self-referential
processing (SRP). Neuroanatomically, this includes reductions in mPFC and PCC connectivity
and activation. SRP can include both explicit and implicit evaluations of oneself, or oneself in
relation to other people. Johnson and colleagues (2002) defined SRP as “A collection of
schemata regarding one’s abilities, traits and attitudes that guides our behaviors, choices and
social interactions” (p. 1,808).
Victims of PTSD often experience negatively biased SRP. Bluhm and colleagues (2012)
were curious about differences between SRP in PTSD victims (n = 20) and a control group
(n = 15). During an fMRI scan, individuals were asked to respond to yes or no statements
regarding their own characteristics (i.e., “I am a good friend”), facts about themselves (i.e., “I am
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6 feet tall”), and general facts (i.e., “Paris is the capital of France,” p. 240). Not only did the
PTSD group endorse more statements like “I feel like an object, not like a person,” or “I feel
isolated and set apart from others” (p. 243), but they also did not experience any advantage when
responding to questions about themselves, responding with similar reaction times to general
facts. This study replicated findings by Johnson and colleagues (2002) and contributed to the
growing number of studies supporting the role of the mPFC and PCC in self-referential
processing. More specifically, their results also indicate diminished mPFC response during the
SRP exercise in PTSD patients relative to healthy individuals.
As mentioned previously, the mPFC is a node in the DMN and a convergence zone
involved with the self-process of integration. Dysfunctions in dmPFC functioning may impact
self-related cognitions and embodied self-awareness, whereas dysfunctions in vmPFC may result
in distortions in impressions of others and conceptual self-awareness (dmPFC). The associations
of these functions are curious in their own right. Together with increases in insular-limbic
connections, victims of PTSD may develop an inherent dysregulation of self and others,
compounded by distrust of emotional and somatic experiences that facilitate the guidance of
actions. Not only may irregular activations potentially lead to aberrant decision-making, but they
may also be linked to the high levels of alexithymia (challenges identifying emotional states)
often found among PTSD victims (Lanius et al., 2011).
Along with poor representation, evaluation, and awareness, other common symptoms
include emotional numbing and affective disturbances such as fear, anger, guilt, and shame. It is
conceivable that disjointed self-processes and fragmented memory (e.g., flashbacks, inability to
remember key features of the traumatic event; APA, 2013) can lead to a rupture in the
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foundations of one’s sense of self. Identity becomes distorted as SRPs become increasingly
negative, promoting a cycle of maladaptive patterns.
Bromberg (2001) asserted that “Self reflectiveness…allows a patient fully to exist in the
moment and simultaneously perceive the self that is existing. The ability of the human mind to
adaptationally limit its self-reflective capacity is the hallmark of dissociation” (p. 231).
Diminishment of self-reflective capacity leads to reactive states, potentially leading to difficulties
in coping and maladaptive behaviors (i.e., violent outbursts, irritability). In relation, Tursich and
colleagues (2015) were curious about how DMN dysregulation related to symptoms of trauma
relative to other networks. They found that reduced DMN functioning was associated with
dissociative symptoms such as derealization and depersonalization, whereas SN activity was
related to symptoms of hyperarousal. Of interest, reduced synchrony was found between the
dorsal anterior DMN (greater involvement in self processing) and posterior DMN (greater
involvement in social processing). Moreover, disequilibrium between the CEN and DMN has
been associated with unaware mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009). Together, the emergence
depersonalization or derealization seems very conceivable. This is consistent with Du and
colleagues’ (2015) encounter of long-term DMN incoherence, despite resolution of anxiety
symptoms (which may be more a reflection of increased SN activity). It may be possible that
dissociative symptoms are more resilient to change, as depersonalization is currently understood
as a result of severe recurrent anxiety with no potential expression (Cozolino, 2014). Indeed,
treatments for depersonalization and derealization have not been very effective. Perhaps the
aforementioned symptoms are at their core an internetwork dysregulation.
A review by Bremner, Elzinga, Schmahl, and Vermetten (2007) noted that the most
consistent findings in patients with PTSD from structural neuroimaging studies are abnormal
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volumes in the mPFC, anterior cingulate, and hippocampus (areas related to DMN). The
reductions found in volumetric studies often imply a decreased capacity in associated functions.
This study encountered right hemispheric lateralization with consistent reductions in left
hippocampal volume and activity. The right hemisphere has been associated with bodily and
non-verbal based experiences (Cozolino, 2010), and left hippocampal regions have been
associated with context-dependent episodic or autobiographical memory (Zhang et al., 2011). In
this light, right-hemisphere amygdala biased networks overwhelm left-hemispheric corticalhippocampal networks, merging terror and fear into discriminatory and self-processes. Indeed,
from a fear-conditioning model, “Extreme sympathetic arousal at the time of a traumatic event
may result in the release of stress neurochemicals (including norepinephrine and epinephrine),
mediating an overconsolidation of trauma memories” (Bryant, 2011, p. 254). Clinically, this
correlation makes it a significant challenge for individuals to access left hemispheric biased
hippocampal networks to regulate the overlearned trauma embedded in amygdala/right
hemispheric biased networks (Cozolino, 2010). This process enables vague emotions to override
logical decision-making, resulting in distorted emotional reasoning.
It seems that the most striking way PTSD affects autobiographical recall is through the
experience of intrusions, consequently destabilizing one’s sense of agency and autonomy;
however, there are also more subtle ways to detect impairment in autobiographical recall. In two
studies, Moradi and colleagues (2008) found that refugees with PTSD had a reduced capacity to
provide specific details from memories on an autobiographical memory test. In their other
experiment, trauma-exposed cancer survivors were found to generate fewer specific semantic
autobiographical details compared to controls. A negative correlation was found between
symptoms and memory impairment. The lack of ability to retrieve details may result in cognitive
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distortions, in particular overgeneralizations, or the magnification of certain details at the
expense of others. This bias may result in the skewing of facts, further reinforcing the fourth
cluster of PTSD: negative mood and cognitions (APA, 2013). Lack of detail in autobiographical
recall, misaligned intuitive responses, and the objectification of self may promulgate a cycle of
negativity. Operating from this disposition, negativity becomes projected in social engagement,
resulting in internal and external strife. Frequent failures in attunement spiral into dissociation
and numbing, as the sense of self recedes into the background.
Final important details that may shed some light on PTSD are studies investigating the
impact of trauma on the DMN in comparison to PTSD on the DMN. It is interesting to note that
DiGangi and colleagues (2016) found reduced DMN connectivity (mPFC, precuneus, and right
superior parietal lobule) in both samples of 22 veterans exposed to combat trauma with PTSD
and 18 without PTSD. They concluded that trauma exposure, rather than the pathology of PTSD,
may be related to DMN changes. Unfortunately, the authors did not examine what functional
changes resulted from reduced DMN connectivity due to traumatic exposure. In support, six
studies support changes in the DMN in acute traumatized victims (Bonne et al., 2003; Du et al.,
2015; Lanius et al., 2010; Lui et al., 2009; Qin et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012). Of curiosity,
DMN dysregulation also appears to be the most resistant to recovery in PTSD, demonstrating
continual reductions 2 years post-trauma in spite of other networks recovering (Du et al., 2015).
It may be that the initial rush of norepinephrine and epinephrine resulting from a traumatic event
facilitates an overconsolidation of the trauma. The resultant reductions in DMN activity, may
then limit self and social functioning in service of survival (Du et al., 2015). This neural event
may then predispose an individual to acquire PTSD. In fact, studies have found that levels of
DMN integrity may predict the severity of symptomology in PTSD patients, as well as the risk of
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developing PTSD (Lanius et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2012). These are critical findings warrant
further research, as they suggest potential symptomology that extends beyond visible symptoms.
With an understanding that simple exposure to a traumatic event can disrupt DMN
functioning, it becomes logical to ask: Does exposure to trauma and the experiences leading to
the development of PTSD alter DMN functioning in different ways? In the context of a temporal
trajectory, it was interesting to note that despite the etiology of PTSD and timing in acute
traumatized victims, findings seem to be fluidly connected across studies. Two studies examined
the DMN just 2 days post MVA traumatic experience (Qin et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012),
together of these studies encountered decreases in connectivity between the PCC and mPFC (Qin
et al., 2012), PCC-bilateral amygdala, and left-right amygdala, which were additionally
predictive of increased severity of PTSD symptology. Consistent findings were encountered just
3 weeks post-trauma as a result of an earthquake (Du et al., 2015), with complete functional
connectivity changes in frontal-limbic-striatal and DMN networks. Surprisingly, 6-12 weeks post
MVA trauma, findings were significant for increased right amygdala connectivity with
PCC/Precuneus (Lanius et al., 2010). Six months post-trauma (MVA), Bonne and colleagues
(2003) found continued increased blood flow to regions related to threat detection, facial
expressions, and motor movements. 8 months post-earthquake with PTSD, individuals
demonstrate reduced mPFC and limbic connectivity (amygdala and hippocampus), which was
also negatively correlated to symptom severity. PCC and insula were also negatively correlated
(Jin et al., 2014). Twenty-five days and 2 years post-trauma, reductions in DMN coherence
continue, in spite of other networks recovering (Du et al., 2015). In extension, two crosssectional studies discovered reductions in grey matter volume in regions of the DMN (insula,
ACC, and mPFC) in survivors 3 years post 9/11, and increased amygdala activity in response to
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viewing fearful faces (Ganzel, Casey, Glover, Voss, & Temple, 2007). As such, there seems to
be underlying neurobiological mechanisms giving rise to PTSD, with the DMN playing a core
role.
Notably, there is convergence within the neuroanatomical findings regardless of the
etiology of PTSD. There was one set of conflicting findings concerning increased (Yan et al.,
2013) and decreased (Yin et al., 2011) right insular activation. Yin and colleagues (2011)
examined survivors of an 8.0 magnitude earthquake in Sichuan 8 months following the natural
disaster. Yan et al. (2013) examined U.S. veterans who served in Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan and/or Operation Iraqi Freedom. Interestingly, Lui and colleagues (2009) examined
individuals 25 days following the Wenchuan earthquake of the same magnitude (8.0), and found
increases in bilateral insular activation.
These deviations may reflect inherent differences in methodology, as well as potential
differences in the developmental trajectory of PTSD for different ethnicities. Another potential
explanation lies in understanding that the insula is related to interoception and somatic
experiences. Culturally, Asian ethnicities have a higher tendency to somaticize psychological
distress (Sue & Sue, 2008). It would be interesting if this cultural disposition presented itself
through DMN dysregulation and whether it unfolds differently over time. In the same context,
there exist instances of delayed-onset PTSD, in particular among individuals who have sustained
a traumatic brain injury. In this vein, despite an amnestic state during an accident, the
reconstruction of memories may result in PTSD in and of itself (Bryant, 2011). This process of
reconstruction may also influence the course of DMN functioning.
The DSM-5 categorizes symptoms in such a way that makes it more amenable to
diagnose individuals: a system that confers both strengths and weaknesses. One pitfall of this
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method is that by creating independent constructs, it becomes easy to lose sight of how these
symptoms really manifest together as a whole. This notion is played out in the TRS, which
appears to play a role in symptoms of hyperarousal, avoidance, intrusions, negative mood and
cognitions, and potentially beyond. Negative valences associated with self and social processes
are defined by DMN connectivity with the limbic system. These conflicts are compounded by
inefficient network transitions, manifesting in poorer executive functioning, attention, and
working memory. Network abnormalities lead to social difficulties, leading to avoidance-based
symptoms, as increased disinhibition results in a loss of control and ultimately a fragmentation of
self.
From a conceptual perspective, PTSD occurring in adulthood seems to work on core
systems of the self from general to specific, or from the outside in. More specifically, in
attachment, individuals develop internal working models that generalize to their experiences of
strangers. Thus, an individual who was securely attached will likely see the world as a safe place
where he/she can take risks without experiencing internal conflict, if this risk were to result in
failure. However, traumatic exposure, (e.g., with veterans being subjected to as well as
perpetrating violence) may result in one’s sense of relational safety and trust becoming obsolete,
as traumatic experiences become internalized into a representation of the world characterized by
distrust, shame, and guilt.
Fragmentation of Time
Perhaps one fundamental aspect of a sense of self that Northoff and Bermpohl’s (2004)
list did not include is temporal perceptivity. Autobiographical recall, prospection, self-reflection,
and social cognition all use degrees of mental time travel. Certainly, the DMN’s association with
mental time travel has been documented in the literature (Østby et al., 2012). Moreover, the
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sense of a continuous self relies on a stable perception and experience of time. This phenomenon
begs the question, Does PTSD impact one’s sense of time? Are there traits that may express this
distortion of time in victims of PTSD?
Literature has supported associations between impulsivity and a distorted sense of time
(Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004; Rubia, Halari, Christakou, & Taylor, 2009; Wittman, Leland,
Churan, & Paulus, 2007). A study by Wittman and colleagues (2011) found that cognitive time
management was related to activations in the inferior frontal and medial frontal cortices, the
anterior insula, as well as the inferior parietal cortex: components of the DMN. In relation,
Heinz, Makin-Byrd, Blonigen, Reilly, and Timko (2015) found an association between PTSD
symptom severity and aggressive behavior. In fact, they found impulsivity to be “a key mediator
between trauma symptoms and aggressive behavior” (p. 59).
Wittman et al. (2011) defined impulsivity as “a pattern of unplanned actions without
regard for the negative consequences that might follow” (p. 44). They further elaborated that
temporal distortions are present in highly impulsive individuals. One example of this correlation
is fallibility in overestimating the costs of suspending time. This deficit results in untimely
reactions, a diminished capacity to endure intervals of time, and poor prospection. Ultimately,
impulsivity is associated with high levels of a present orientation and a reduced ability to think in
the future. More directly, the authors also suggested that several studies have shown impulsive
individuals to overestimate and under-produce time intervals. Neurobiologically, the authors
found increasing activation in the posterior insula during the encoding phase of their experiment.
Moreover, they found that levels of activation in motor execution regions were correlated with
impulsivity and behavioral performance. One theory related to this phenomenon is that the
subjective experience of duration is directly related to the amount of energy expended during
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cognitive processing (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009). Others have proposed that the inherent
features of time perception are intimately tied to memory (Staddon, 2005; Wackermann & Ehm,
2006).
In relation to impulsivity in PTSD, one finds higher activations in the insula and denser
connections with the limbic system. Deficits in the tolerance of impulse and affect are well
known traits of individuals afflicted with PTSD. This deficiency may be further exacerbated by
cognitive misalignments of time estimations as well as a decreased capacity to hold potential
benefits in mind for long enough due to working memory, attention, and executive-based deficits
(Vasterling & Brailey, 2005).
The inability to delay gratification as a result of lack of impulse control relates to the
earlier discussion of the developmental trajectory of 7-9 year olds. Irritability, reckless and selfdestructive behavior, and angry outbursts are all related to, if not inclusive of, impulsivity.
Indeed, Briere and Spinazzola (2005) understood these difficulties as “self-capacities,” further
defining them as “dysfunction[s] in one’s abilities to regulate one’s internal experience and one’s
interaction with others,” with dysfunctional behaviors resulting from this domain, including:
“suicidality, impulse control, substance abuse and tension reduction behaviors” (p. 402).
Holeman (1996) suggested that individuals with PTSD experience temporal
disintegration, or “a process in which the present moment becomes isolated from the continuity
of past and future time” (p. xi). From this vantage point, intrusions and triggering experiences
can be seen as an inability to separate past experiences from the present. In support of Holeman’s
hypothesis, Holocaust survivors frequently, albeit anecdotally, reported feeling disoriented in
relation to their experience of the past and present. The natural trajectory of temporal integration
then becomes stymied by temporal disintegration as a result of trauma. In conjunction with
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Wittman and colleagues’ study (2011), the present becomes cognitively misattuned to and
temporally understood out of context. In this light, the stability and continuity of self becomes
threatened. In reviewing several studies, Wittman et al. concluded that “individuals become
cognitively and emotionally ‘stuck’ in their prior traumatic experiences, and are likely to
experience elevated levels of distress once it has passed” (p. 83), suggesting that “severity
predicts the immediate response, which, in turn, is associated with the degree of past orientation
and distress” (p. 84).
From a neurobiological perspective, reductions in precuneal activity in PTSD victims
(Yan et al., 2013) may be related. The precuneus has been found to play a role in self-related
mental representations and the integration of past and present information. In this context,
decreased precuneal activity may be reducing an individual’s access to internal resources,
hindering flexibility and the ability to relate memories to the present context.
Victims of severe PTSD are dominated by past traumatic experiences and the threat of a
biased imagined future, losing grasp of the present. Cognitive and emotional distortions in time
promulgate decision-making that is not based in reality. The ruptured integrity of temporal
experience directly impacts the continuity and stability of self. Confusion and limited
metacognitive capacity lead to impulsivity, impacting relationships negatively. Self-awareness
and identity become negatively biased, as the mPFC, PCC, and limbic relationships are adapted
to a reality that has passed. Subjective distress is maintained and victims are unable to switch off
the SN during times of self-reflection. Moreover, as they engage with the environment, they are
unable to inhibit their negative cycles of self. How is it, then, that dysregulated DMN activity
may lead to social impairment? Do these negative cycles get projected into the environment, or
do they stay hidden in the self?
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The DMN and Social Processes
The relationship between the DMN and social cognition is well documented (Laird et al.,
2011; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008). The importance of social
cognitive processes is endless. They mediate attachment processes between the parent-child
dynamic, promote human survival through communal living and socializing, and serve as a
baseline for people to reason morally and act with beneficence. The necessity to track the
complexity of our ever growing and changing social networks has become vital. The trajectory
of human brain development has been suggestive of these adaptations, and can be characterized
by its tendency to differentiate with increasing complexity. From the perspective of social
neuroscience, scholars propose that the act of observing and imagining another person in a
particular emotional state leads to an automatic reproduction of that state as it is neurally
represented in the observer, thus resulting in what is called a shared neural representation
(Singer & Lamm, 2009). Table 4 includes four social cognitive functions that Nietlisbach &
Maercker (2009) consider to be important for successful social interactions. Saxe’s (2006) notion
of Representational ToM was included to provide further specificity and accuracy.
Table 4
Social Cognitive Functions
Social Cognition
Theory of Mind (ToM; Nietlisbach &
Maercker, 2009)
Representational ToM (Saxe, 2006)
Empathy (Nietlisbach & Maercker,
2009)
Emotional Resonance (Nietlisbach &
Maercker, 2009)
Perception of social exclusion
(Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009)

Description
Cognitive; Recognizing that another has a mind and
accurately assuming what that mental state is
How a mental state is represented in the other
Affective; shared emotional state via observation and
imagination
Non-conscious, implicit, affective resonance via nonverbal cues, social signals
Exclusion = Death; detecting rejection important for
survival.
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Notably, Saxe’s (2006) review found that ToM and representational ToM could be
understood as developmental phases2 in social cognition. Saxe suggested that evidence
converges on the right TPJ as an area selectively associated with higher levels of ToM. She
additionally pointed out that the PCC and medial frontal regions are recruited for overall social
cognition, with the vmPFC being activated in tasks of empathy and volumetric grey matter
corresponding to net social connections and mentalizing (Lewis et al., as cited in Saxe, 2006).
Evidently, all the aforementioned regions are part of the DMN.
A study by Nazarov and colleagues (2014) demonstrated deficits in ToM in 51 women
diagnosed with PTSD due to childhood abuse. The study involved two tasks. One task was the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (RMET), a computer based task commonly used in
ToM investigations. Put simply, the program presents cropped photographs of eyes and the
surrounding facial region. Participants are required to decipher what individuals may be feeling
or thinking by choosing one in four adjectives post-presentation. Reaction times and accuracy of
scores are recorded. In this experiment, PTSD victims were slower at deducting complex mental
states from emotionally salient facial expressions in comparison to healthy women.
In the second task, subjects were given the Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15).
They were shown 15 1-minute videos of social interactions and then asked questions (multiple
choice) regarding the particular interaction that had occurred in the videos. In this task a
significant correlation was found between ToM performance, dissociation, and depressive
symptoms, with increases in the aforementioned symptoms strongly associated with decreased
accuracy in identification and a distorted understanding of kinship interactions. Depressive
symptoms were related to decrements in identifying negative and positive mental states, whereas

2

ToM can be seen in a 3-year-old, however representational ToM is usually only seen in a 4-5-year-old.
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dissociative symptoms were related to reduced capacity to identify positive and neutral mental
states. Notably, the authors emphasized that these poorer performances were related to higher
levels of disengagement, memory disturbance, and identity dissociation. Indeed, women who
have been abused tend to perceive family environments as less cohesive and experience greater
challenges in marital functioning and attachment in adult relationships (Nazarov et al., 2014).
These experiences may culminate in the perception of social exclusion, further promoting the
cycle of PTSD.
These challenges in relationships extend across other victims of PTSD generalizing into
different environments. PTSD has been found to increase one’s risk of unemployment by 150%
and marital instability by 60% (Galovsky & Lyons, 2004). In one study (Riggs, Byrne, Weathers,
& Litz, 1998), 70% of veterans with significant others reported relationship distress, as opposed
to 30% of veterans who were not diagnosed with PTSD. The severity of PTSD was also found to
have a direct correlation to the levels of distress reported. More specifically, victims of PTSD
encountered challenges with intimacy, leading to the process of separation and divorce. One of
PTSD’s major contributors to relational challenges is numbing (MacDonald, Chamberlain, Long,
& Flett, 1999; Ray & Vanstone, 2009). Emotional expression plays a profound role in relational
quality. Restricted disclosure, communication challenges, and affective blunting propagate
ambiguity, leading to reduced trust, marital disarray, and detachment (Riggs et al., 1998). In
addition to marital discord, parenting has also been documented as an issue among individuals
diagnosed with PTSD. Harkness (1993) described reports of veterans’ parenting to be
controlling, overprotective, and demanding. In line with these findings, it was estimated that four
out of five veteran families centered their lives around the veterans’ irritability, aggressiveness,
depression, and withdrawal.
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These relational challenges are likely influenced by task-switching rigidity and enhanced
connectivity to the SN. Two other functions that have been associated with DMN activity are the
perception of facial expressions and processing of social relationships (Cozolino, 2014). As
suggested by Nietlisbach and Maercker (2009), PTSD victims likely interpret social signals
inaccurately and as a result base their actions on biased attempts at mind-reading. The perception
of accurate social interactions requires the integration of non-verbal cues while assuming the
perspectives of others. Such misalignments in interpretation will inevitably result in a reduced
the capacity for emotional resonance and potential perceptions of social exclusion. Deficits in
ToM and emotional resonance will consequently interrupt the capacity to experience a shared
emotional state (empathy). In this context, it is not surprising that PTSD has been found to
negatively impact self-awareness, intimacy, sexuality, and communication, all of which are
fundamental in maintaining healthy interpersonal relationships.
Flexibility and accuracy in social cognition are contingent upon the quality of internal
development, as well as the capacity for self-reflection (Lanius et al., 2011). Imagined
interactions—whether future, present, or past—are rooted in their necessity to utilize mental
representations from autobiographical memory (Spreng et al., 2009). The use of autobiographical
memory in social cognition highlights the DMN as a strategic system that is used in social
processes, such as empathy (Mars et al., 2012). These important foundational and functional
relationships help explain the shared use of the DMN for both self and social processes.
Similarly, self-referential processing has been intimately tied to mentalizing. Mentalizing
is “a form of mostly preconscious imaginative mental activity, namely perceiving and
interpreting human behavior in terms of intentional mental states (e.g., needs, desires, feelings,
beliefs, goals, purposes, reasons)” (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008, p. 2). Areas such as the
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PCC, TPJ, and medial frontal cortex have all been associated with the ability to understand and
attribute mental states of others (Mars et al., 2012). The DMN’s relationship with areas involved
in ToM and mentalizing was further supported by Schilbach and colleagues (2008), who
similarly noted their shared circuitry as a salient feature. They found that both involved the
precuneus, left angular gyrus, and ACC. These areas are involved with social interactions,
differentiating self and others, and action monitoring in self and others, respectively. The authors
suggested that the DMN primes an individual for social cognition.
It is interesting to note that reduced activation in the mPFC can result in the experience of
what Fonagy has termed disruptive impulsion, or uncontained unmentalized experiences, often
characterized as an unstoppable urge to do something (Allen et al., 2008). This description is
reflective of the impulsivity often observed in victims of PTSD (Heinz et al., 2015).
Jack and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that social tasks consistently activated areas of
the DMN while inhibiting areas activated during mechanical reasoning (i.e., dorsal parietal and
lateral prefrontal cortices, both members of a TPN). This finding supports the hypothesis that
human brains appear to be neurally bound to one cognitive mode at a time. The DMN thus plays
a role in figure-ground perception, temporarily suppressing analytical thinking in order to
promote reflection upon self and socially-related processes or suppressing such processes in
order to focus on environmental demands. They hypothesized two possibilities of this
relationship:
1. It may serve to increase the effectiveness of predicting future behavior. There would
be more room for error if the system used for predicting an inanimate object were
used for predicting human behavior, and vice versa. Suppose one reasoned that a gun
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would begin firing if it felt threatened, or conversely that individuals are just things,
objects that can be destroyed without any consequence.
2. Another possibility, for which the authors show preference, is the need to distinguish
between conscious moral entities and non-conscious inanimate objects. Limitations
and sensitivity are required with human beings, whereas applying these same rules
with inanimate objects would simply not make sense.
These arguments are very interesting from the vantage point of trauma. The TRS formed from
the merger of the DMN and SN, with reductions in CEN functioning, disrupts fluid transitions
from reflective/social states to task oriented states (mechanical reasoning) and vice-versa
(Daniels et al., 2010). Interference within DMN-SN-CEN functioning during different contexts is
likely mirrored by the blending of different cognitive modes. Indeed, it is common for victims of
PTSD to endorse statements like “I feel like an object, not like a person” (Bluhm et al., 2012).
Given the overlapping mapping of social and self-processes, it is likely that an objectification of
self may further generalize into an objectification of others. Understandably, this may have
served an adaptive function during war, where empathic attunement with enemies would
undoubtedly be maladaptive. Life-threatening circumstances necessitate individuals to think
more mechanically, rather than sensitively. This may help explain why violence and
interpersonal challenges are so common with victims of PTSD. An overconsolidated and
generalized psychological reaction to a dangerous environment may drastically increase the
chances of insensitive behaviors in an objectively non-threatening environment. This
generalization may then present as maladaptive forms of reasoning, where mechanical reasoning
is used in introspective/social processes, and where aspects of social reasoning are utilized in
mechanical reasoning.
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Another manifestation of the disrupted neural binding of independent cognitive modes
may be seen in literature supporting magical thinking and a belief in paranormal activities, both
of which have been robustly correlated with a history of childhood trauma (Rogers & Lowrie,
2016). Traumatic experiences may become so painful that an individual may lose ownership and
dissociate (i.e., derealization, depersonalization) and these symptoms may become so
pronounced that a victim may no longer desire to live in his/her own body. This may catalyze an
externalization of identity whereby identity becomes embedded in the environment (Cozolino,
2010), an example being inanimate objects acquiring a life of their own; likely projected aspects
of an individual’s self. Therefore, it seems that being neurally bound to one cognitive mode at a
time is necessary for adaptive living: something that individuals with PTSD may likely not
experience in its entirety.
Interestingly, Matthew Lieberman (2013) has argued that the overlap between social and
self-processes in the DMN suggests not only that are humans interested in the social world but
also that this interest is a biological disposition. Through shared circuitry, the DMN promotes
cooperation, empathy, and working in groups. This would identify the DMN as a “cause, rather
than a consequence, of our focus on the social world” (p. 21). In addition he has argued that “The
self exists primarily as a conduit to let the social groups we are immersed in (that is, our family,
our school, our country) supplement our natural impulses with socially derived impulses”
(pp. 191-192). From this perspective, the hypothesis for the evolutionary emergence of the DMN
would be to enhance the necessity of living in groups by promoting social harmony, as living in
groups increases the potential for survival.
In support of his ideas, PTSD results in a disengagement from social affairs, decreased
levels of moral sensitivity, and poorer social cognitive abilities (Lanius et al., 2011), in addition
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to frequent reports of interpersonal difficulties families have with returning veterans (Laffaye,
Cavella, Drescher, & Rosen, 2008; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Wilcox, 2010). Social experiences
are undoubtedly important in recovery from PTSD. In fact, lack of social support is one of the
highest predictors of PTSD, and has been found to develop and maintain it (Nietlisbach &
Maercker, 2009). Similarly, the absence of social acknowledgment was determined to be an
important factor in trauma processing and recovery, as it increased the risk of PTSD.
Moral Judgment and the DMN
Given the types of self and social activities involved with the activation of the DMN, it
comes as no surprise that moral judgment was also found to activate areas of the DMN (Eslinger
et al., 2009; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom,
Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Moll, Eslinger, & De Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza,
Bramati, & Grafman, 2002; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002; Prehn et al., 2008;
Reniers et al., 2012). Reniers and colleagues (2012) defined moral judgment as “the competency
to apply moral values and principles consistently when making decisions in social situations”
(p. 203). In reviewing studies conducted with veterans, Litz and colleagues (2009) discussed the
impact of events that may lead to what they term moral injury, “Such as perpetrating, failing to
prevent or bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and
expectations” (p. 700). Their focus, then, is on the potential distress caused by participation in
traumatic scenarios, as opposed to negative experiences resulting from being a victim. The
rupture in one’s deeply held belief system progresses into inner dissonance and distress,
interrupting an individual’s capacity to act in accordance with his/her values. If not addressed,
morally injurious behaviors may consequently lead to an internalization of guilt, resulting in
shame. Litz and colleagues shared that behaviors secondary to moral injury include:
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Self-harming behaviors…alcohol and drug abuse, severe recklessness and parasuicidal
behavior, self-handicapping behaviors, such as retreating in the face of success or good
feelings and demoralization, which may entail confusion, bewilderment, futility,
hopelessness and self-loathing…most damaging is the possibility of enduring changes in
self and other beliefs that reflect regressive over-accommodation of moral violation,
culpability or expectations of injustice. (p. 701)
It is fitting to note that intuitions and internal representations of personal norms and
values are associated with activity from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) to the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). As mentioned earlier, the mPFC has dense connections with the
limbic system, rendering it a higher-order integrative region associated with identity (Cozolino,
2010). Interestingly, these decreases were also found by Yan and colleagues (2013), who studied
the resting states of veterans with PTSD. It is possible that increased activation in these regions
is necessary during moral judgment, as it requires the recruitment of SRPs along with social
cognition (Reniers et al., 2012). In conjunction with correlations between DMN and morality,
mind wandering, an activity that has been associated with DMN activation, has been associated
with the generation of meaning, which in and of itself has been found to support well-being and
health (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).
An integral part of human experience is the process of discovering and living a
meaningful life. Morality is both internalized through early experiences and discovered with selfawareness. For some, living a life of value becomes a conscious decision, whereas others may
live without ever considering the meaning systems that play a role in their everyday decisions. In
light of varying dispositions, the typical reaction to morally incongruent behavior is guilt and
shame. Moral injury results in the disempowerment of pre-existing value systems, increasing the
chances of meaningless and chaotic experiences, and consequently resulting in the acting out of
impulses. Unfortunately, it seems this inability to contain impulses promotes a cycle that
reinforces a fundamental identification with shame.
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This cycle is particularly relevant in aggression and violence among war veterans with
PTSD, who have higher levels of aggression and violence in interpersonal settings (Riggs et al.,
1998). In their review of seven studies, Riggs et al. (1998) further noted that this population
viewed violence as an appropriate solution to certain conflicts, with some veterans deriving
pleasure from the acts, despite the ensuing guilt. These specific impulse control-deficient
behaviors along with increased psychopathic-like responses may represent a reorganization of
mPFC activity (Reniers et al., 2012) and its altered relationship with the limbic system.
Overlapping self and social processes serve as a platform for moral sensitivity. Their
relationship makes it natural to infer that moral injury need not come from personal perpetration
of morally insensitive behaviors. Just as neural systems of social engagement (i.e., mirror
neuron) enable people to learn positive and adaptive behaviors from others, it is possible that the
witnessing of moral transgressions made by role models, or the mere act of being ordered by a
trusted official to commit a morally incongruent behavior, may become internalized and acquired
as in internal conflict. The subsequent dissonance and doubt may become reflected in DMN
functioning, consequently supplementing the detrimental cycle of PTSD. Repeated acts lead to
desensitization, further promulgating the disintegration of boundaries and maladaptive actions.

49
Chapter 4: Conclusion and Discussion
Methodological Limitations
The most salient limitation of this review is the availability of research on the DMN.
Although research on PTSD is abundant, it was not until the year 2001 that the DMN was first
adopted as a viable construct (Raichle et al., 2001). To compensate for the latter problem, all
available journals were considered when investigating the DMN and PTSD. This choice resulted
in a sacrifice of quality, as journals vary in their degree of rigor. In consideration of this
challenge, it is also important to take into account that the costly usage of brain imaging often
requires a thorough examination of methodological procedures. Another possible shortcoming is
the relatively small sample size encountered in research including the use of brain imaging,
which may threaten external validity. To obtain a more comprehensive outlook, relevant studies
that examined the DMN, PTSD, and self and social functioning independently were additionally
integrated as appropriate.
Another related shortcoming is that there is still a lack of consensus on specific regions
that make up the DMN, SN, and CEN. Although there are recurring nodes (such as the mPFC in
the DMN), there is still debate as to precise neuroanatomical correlates. This disagreement
resulted in the identification of some overlapping regions between and within the DMN, SN, and
CEN. In this context, interpreted patterns from brain scans should be approached with caution.
A variety of etiologies may additionally result in PTSD. One may be a victim of PTSD
via a variety of traumatic incidents, including but not limited to physical abuse, sexual abuse,
emotional abuse, natural disasters, or accidents. Moreover this study included ten studies from
China and one from South Korea. Given the lack of overall research, inferences were drawn
about overall findings. As indicated in an earlier chapter, different findings may correspond to
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different cultural backgrounds and manifestations of symptoms. A categorization of studies can
be seen in Table 5.
Table 5
Etiological Categorization of Studies
Natural Disaster
Jin et al. (2014)*
EQ
Shang et al. (2014)*
EQ
Suo et al. (2015)*
EQ

Childhood Trauma
Tursich et al. (2015)

MVA
Zhang et al. (2015)*

Veterans/Combat
Dunkley et al. (2015)

Bluhm et al. (2009)

Lanius et al. (2010)

Sripada et al. (2012)

Daniels et al. (2010)

Qin et al. (2012)*

DiGangi et al. (2016)

Lei et al. (2015)*
EQ

Bremner et al. (1997)

Bonne et al. (2003)

Yan et al. (2013)

Du et al. (2015)*
EQ

Bing et al. (2013)

Yin et al. (2011)*
EQ

Long et al. (2013)*

Lui et al. (2009)
EQ

Zhou et al. (2012)

Zhang et al. (2011)* Coal
Mine Flood Disaster
Survivors

Chung et al. (2006)**
18 MVA, 3 domestic
violence, 2 physical
assault
Note. Patel et al. (2012) extracted data from 13 resting state studies, integrating findings on PTSD-DMN. Integrated
findings were included in the study, however independent studies were not. In addition, Kemp and colleagues (2010)
did not specify etiology and as such was not included. *China, ** South Korea, EQ: Earthquake, MVA: Motor
Vehicle Accident

Existing literature also indicates that individuals can develop PTSD from re-constructing
events post-amnesia (Bryant, 2011) or through vicarious exposure to traumata. There is also the
question of Complex PTSD. These sorts of experiences have yet to be investigated from the
perspective of the DMN, and thus cannot speak for PTSD as a whole. Given the developmental
state of the literature on the DMN and the difficulties in yielding clean results, this study
integrated as much literature on the DMN as possible. In this context, it was assumed that despite
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differing etiologies and subjective experiences, symptomological manifestations are similar and
reflected in underlying brain functioning.
Conclusion
This study explored the neurobiological and subjective sequelae of PTSD during resting
state. The first research question posed was, What does the research literature tell us about the
role of the DMN? The DMN, often known as the brain’s resting state network, has been found to
be associated with autobiographical recall, self-referential processing, prospection, social
cognition, and moral sensitivity. Brain regions associated with the DMN include the mPFC,
bilateral temporal and parietal lobes, PCC, insula, and precuneus. Studies reveal that the DMN
plays a role in processing information and can be characterized by its unique involvement in the
self and social processes. The convergence of these processes contributes to an individual’s
ability to experience and develop a differentiated self in the context of a social environment.
The second question posed was, How does trauma impact DMN functioning? DMN
dysregulation has been identified as soon as two days post-traumatic exposure. Traumatic
exposure results in the emergence of the SN (i.e., insula, putamen, ACC) during resting states,
along with general reductions in DMN (i.e., bilateral temporoparietal, PCC, and mPFC) and
CEN functioning (i.e. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex). This generates
a traumatized resting state (TRS). The nature of this merger results in internetwork rigidity
manifesting as difficulties toggling between states of self-reflection/social cognition and task
orientation. These difficulties are characterized by increased DMN functioning during task
orientation and an increased orientation towards detecting salience (SN activity) during
introspective states. Furthermore increased dissociations between frontal networks and the limbic
system may lead to more difficulty inhibiting emotional arousal. In extension, results are
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suggestive of hyperactive limbic system and hypoactive frontal cortical activity.
Neuropsychologically, the TRS results in poorer working memory, attention, and executive
functions. Furthermore, interfering activity from internetworks likely results in the manifestation
of social reasoning during moments requiring analytical reasoning, and vice versa.
Reductions in volume, connectivity and activity of the DMN have been encountered long
after traumatic exposure, despite stabilization of other networks (and resolution of anxiety) in
victims of trauma. Furthermore, symptoms of depersonalization and derealization were
associated with DMN incoherence. It is likely that the surge of neurochemicals facilitates an
overconsolidation of the trauma. Dissociated and reduced hippocampal functioning may suggest
an inability to re-process traumatic memories through discriminatory networks, subsequently
impacting core processes of self and others.
Compromised integrity of the DMN has been found to contribute to less detailed
autobiographical recall, negatively biased self-referential processing (i.e., guilt, shame),
inaccurate social cognition (i.e., ToM, emotional resonance), and reduced capacity for moral
judgment (i.e., moral injury). Impoverished self-functions and social processes result in
interpersonal challenges. Representations of moral transgressions, negativity, and shame may all
become internalized, creating a new foundation from which victims of PTSD operate.
In addition, PTSD victims experience discontinuities in time, as well as cognitive
management challenges, leading to impulsivity and difficulties in accurately assessing the
benefits of delayed gratification. These experiences lead to a variety of self and interpersonal
difficulties, such as numbing, dissociation, marital discord, violence, and poor social
relationships.
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From a developmental perspective, the DMN of PTSD victims appears re-configured to
resemble that of an earlier developmental stage (7-9 year old). In conjunction with other
symptoms, this level of de-integration results in an increase of environmental reactivity, and
diminished potential for self/social reflection and development. With all these symptoms taken
together, one can assert that trauma results in DMN dysregulation. Subjectively, core aspects of
social and self-related functions become fragmented and replaced by maladaptive models that
function within chaotic or rigid boundaries.
Table 6
Neuropsychological Profile of DMN Dysfunction: Traumatized Resting State
Neural Functioning
Reduced connectivity of mPFC and
limbic regions. Hypoactivity in mPFC
and hyperactivity in amygdala.
Increased connectivity and activation
of PCC with right amygdala

Description
Increased emotional reactivity, aberrant self-referential
processing

Decreased connectivity between PCC
with precuneus, bilateral parietal
cortex and mPFC

Threat, survival, negative biased processing in
evaluation of environment and emotion mediated
memory
Inaccurate (biased) and decreased capacity for
evaluation of self, prospection, social cognition and
moral sensitivity

Reduced left hippocampal functioning
Increase in right hippocampus

Reduced autobiographical recall (context-dependent)
Memory for locations (priming for action)

Decreased activity in precuneus,
mPFC and right superior parietal
lobule
Reduced connectivity with ACC with
mPFC and medial temporal gyrus
Increased Insula activity and
connectivity with SN (amygdala)
Reduced insula connectivity PCC

Reduced capacity for self-reflection and biased
prospection.

Dissociated left and right amygdala

Dissonance between “oops center” with self-function,
social cognition and moral sensitivity
Poor interoception - exaggerated bodily response
Interoception is dissonant with evaluative functions and
emotion-mediated memory
Left: pleasant and/or unpleasant emotions, reward
system. Right: negative emotions, fear and sadness)

Overall, trauma alters large scale network functioning: SN intrusions in DMN functioning during
resting state, and DMN intrusions during CEN functioning.
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Clinical Implications
This review synthesized the available literature on the DMN and PTSD, providing the
research community with easier access to information concerning the relationship between them.
The overarching aim of this study is to improve upon current understanding of PTSD in hopes of
catalyzing better treatments.
At its foundation, this review demonstrates that psychological trauma can alter brain
functioning. Conversely, this understanding may serve as an opportunity to educate patients on
the plastic nature of the brain. This may increase their hope for recovery, as a concerted effort to
change may result in alterations of brain functioning. For example, the use of mindfulness has
been found to alter DMN functioning (Brewer et al., 2011) and increase cortical thickness of
right medial and superior frontal cortices and the insula (Lazar et al., 2005). In conjunction, the
awareness of the DMN as an evolutionary design may help others capture the importance of
introspective processes. In effect, this awareness could stimulate a greater desire for attunement
to self, an easier access to an open and curious attitude, and increased sensitivity in relationships.
Education increases awareness. Teaching a patient how the DMN plays a role in PTSD
may reduce their uncertainties. The DMN provides a neurobiological model to guide treatment.
Knowledge of the DMN’s functions (autobiographical recall, self-reflection, social cognition,
and moral sensitivity) and its subsystems (vmPFC in the MTL subsystem: processing emotional
features; the anterior mPFC and PCC: elaboration and experience of self; and dmPFC and the
TPJ: social cognition) provides the clinician with further guidance on treatment that is founded in
biology. The seeming developmental regression of the DMN of a PTSD victim may further assist
a clinician with conceptualization. More specifically, treatment may necessitate the
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reestablishment of connectivity between PCC-mPFC and PCC-left MTL: salient areas potentially
distinguishing a PTSD victim from a non-PTSD individual (Supekar et al., 2010).
Clinically, the development of a therapeutic relationship that enables appropriate levels of
integration between and within the DMN can be seen as a neurobiological goal. To the author’s
knowledge, there has not been any research supporting the use of medication to improve DMN
integrity. In this vein, this study supports the necessity of psychotherapy in the treatment of an
individual with PTSD. Narratives may assist in weaving DMN functions together, and may
provide a route by which to improve upon DMN integrity. This may explain why trauma
narratives are often used in treatment, along with the processing of sensations, images, feelings,
and thoughts. Studies demonstrating insular-limbic connections may also increase the validity of
the novel forms of therapy that emphasize the necessity to process bodily experiences associated
with trauma, such as somatic experiencing or EMDR. In expansion of this concept, the added
component of mindfulness meditation may assist in developing a healthy orientation to the
present and a non-judgmental attitude, further promoting functional relationships within the
mPFC and strengthening its descending inhibitory circuitry with the limbic system.
Furthermore, it is important to highlight the DMN as a neural network bridging (the
capacity and experience of) others and the self (BOATS). Deficits in ToM, emotional resonance,
and empathy will ultimately lead to maladaptive environmental expectations that can drive
behavior. In this light, it is likely that the DMN mediates therapeutic phenomena such as
projection, transference, and countertransference. Moreover, given the DMN’s relation with
mind-wandering, it is very possible that the technique of free association may provide a gateway
into an individuals DMN. DMN studies thus begin grounding the aforementioned concepts in
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empirical science. These findings also lend further support for the use of psychodynamic and
relational approaches of psychotherapy when working with PTSD.
The importance of DMN functioning and its role in PTSD stimulates a dialogue on
changes in identity and biases in self/social interactions. Understanding that human neurobiology
may create illusory experiences may support an individual’s capacity to adopt a more
exploratory approach, as opposed to an identification with such changes. Comparing how an
individual related to the world in the past and how he/she currently relates to the world may
facilitate a discussion that enables him/her to identify his/her traumatic experience as a
representation that has infiltrated his/her pre-existing system.
From the perspective of diagnosis and triaging, social impairment should be considered a
primary cluster, rather than a secondary one. In this vein, attending to relational difficulties
should become a principle focus during treatment. Such attention may include educating family
members as well as PTSD victims on the importance of relationships as well as the signs that
may emerge naturally as PTSD runs its course. Developing methods to improve expectation
management would be wise. Another important factor to consider would be the use of family and
group psychotherapy in the treatment of PTSD. The social sequelae of PTSD are clearly
documented in the literature, and it would be wise to consider methods that treat social
challenges.
Another direct treatment technique may include the utilization of a chart or other means
(such as an app) of increasing awareness of how victims of PTSD divide their time during resting
states. Doing so may facilitate deeper insight, enabling individuals to act from a more informed
place. Awareness of underlying processes facilitates internal stability. Moreover, this knowledge
may further promote healthy practices. Especially given temporal distortions in PTSD, it may be
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easy for such victims to lose track of time spent invested in certain activities, thus serving as a
reality check.
Discussion and Directions for Future Research
Overall, PTSD and DMN dysregulation have been found to involve major areas of the
brain; however, the degree of their involvement and levels of connectivity have been shown to
fluctuate, as noted by Patel et al. (2012). These variations may be due to environmental
variables (i.e. environmental perturbation may impact DMN activity), inherent differences in
individual development, the etiological variations of PTSD (i.e., vehicular accident, early abuse,
natural disaster, or war), and the course of PTSD (i.e., traumatic exposure, onset, maintenance,
recovery). Research has just begun to address these gaps and findings have thus far are
promising (DiGangi et al., 2016; Du et al., 2015). Unfortunately, both of these studies did not
systematically examine the potential psychological challenges reflected in their findings.
Increasing current knowledge on DMN development over the trajectory of PTSD would be a
very valuable path of research, increasing awareness in order to better treatment and potential
predictive capacity.
Notably, studies have also found that levels of DMN integrity may predict the severity of
symptomology in PTSD patients, as well as the risk of developing PTSD (Lanius et al., 2010;
Zhou et al., 2012). Although further research is necessary, this may introduce the notion of
developing of an assessment measure that reliably assesses DMN functioning. As such,
understanding PTSD from the perspective of the DMN may serve as a powerful diagnostic and
prognostic tool. Such an assessment measure may help gauge the quality of DMN functions. In
theory, this should also reflect the level of DMN integrity, which may then be further used to
help predict and plot a course of recovery.
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DiGangi and colleagues (2016) study warrants further research. Although their study was
fascinating, it had several limitations, including: a small sample size, the use of a correlational
design, a strictly male veteran sample, and a lack of correlation between combat exposure and
PTSD symptom severity (clinical and functional relevance of reduced connectivity unclear).
Moreover, the data collection was completed in 2012, and as such the DSM-IV-TR criteria were
used. It would be interesting to examine what functional changes resulted from reduced DMN
connectivity due to traumatic exposure. Their findings (in conjunction with Du and colleagues
[2015]), may indicate that DMN dysregulation results in symptomology that extends beyond
current PTSD criteria, beginning with traumatic exposure. It will be beneficial for this study to
be replicated while accounting for these limitations, and determine whether an individual
diagnosed with PTSD can be distinguished via his/her DMN functioning. Moreover, considering
results from Tursich and colleagues (2015), it would be wise if future studies investigating DMN
dysregulation include measures of dissociation (especially viewing depersonalization and
derealization).
Another interesting pattern encountered is the merger of the DMN and SN during resting
state. The TRS is reminiscent of Baars’s (2002) Global Workspace Theory, whereby competing
internal and external signals result in mind wandering. The difference lies in the simultaneous
activation of the CEN (directing attention and working memory) during states of unaware mind
wandering (Christoff et al., 2009), as opposed to the SN in PTSD. Could DMN dysregulation be
understood as disorganized mind wandering rooted in trauma? This parallel may warrant further
research.
One central question of clinical utility is, How resilient to change is the DMN (and the
DMN of individuals with PTSD)? Practically, this would be another highly beneficial route of
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research for both PTSD victims and the general public. Taylor and colleagues (2012) researched
differences in DMN activity between beginner meditators and experienced meditators and found
significant differences. One finding included a weaker correlation between vmPFC and dmPFC
in experienced meditators, reflective of a reduction in emotional appraisal during self-referential
processing, promoting acceptance of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. Another finding is a
stronger correlation between the right inferior parietal lobule and the precuneus, which the
authors suggested is indicative of a reduction of self-referential thoughts and greater global
attention and present moment awareness. Given the current knowledge that this neural network
can be manipulated intentionally, PTSD survivors may greatly benefit from the instillation of
hope. It is also interesting to note that having a healthy DMN is not so much about overall
increased integration as it is about strategic levels and degrees of integration within and between
the network.
One fascinating study by Kilpatrick and colleagues (2015) explored how resilient
personality characteristics may be reflected in the DMN and SN and how that may differ by
gender. They found that increased connectivity between SN with several brain regions, including
the right anterior insula, was significantly associated with resilient personality in men and
women. Sex differences were found in the extent of functional integration in regions of the
anterior DMN (aDMN) and posterior DMN (pDMN), with psychologically resilient women
demonstrating increased functional integration in the aDMN and men in the pDMN. They
speculated that both systems play a big role in self-referential processing; however, aDMN is
more involved with emotion-cognition interactions, social cognition, verbal expression related
functions, and socially guided decision-making. In contrast, the pDMN was more involved in
emotion-memory, internally guided decision-making in uncertainty, and visuospatial-related
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functions. It would be interesting to study whether proportionally modifying approaches to focus
on emotion-cognition would be more effective for traumatized women overall (or emotionmemory for males).
Another interesting concept proposed by Djiksterhuis, Strick, Bos, and Nordgren (2014)
may play a subtle role in PTSD victims. They proposed that the DMN partially contributes to
what they call Type 3 processing in addition to Type 1 (unconscious, fast, associative, automatic,
and effortless) and Type 2 (conscious, slow, logical, rule based, goal-directed, and effortful)
processing. They view Type 3 processing it as a “conscious intermezzi” (p. 360): a form of
processing that is largely unconscious, very slow, abstract, exploratory, goal dependent, and
largely effortless. They specified that two conscious intrusions bring Type 3 processing to light:
(a) the awareness of an unconscious goal when progress becomes difficult; and (b) when an
answer to a challenging question arises while doing something completely different, also known
as a eureka moment. They view Type 3 processing as necessary in creative problem solving and
making important decisions. They did, however, specify that working memory involvement is
necessary, and as such the DMN is not solely responsible for all Type 3 processing.
If this form of processing were indeed to exist as proposed, it would reveal further
potential risks faced by PTSD victims: more specifically, amplifying challenges with problem
solving and indicating further disconnects between conscious and unconscious modes of
processing. It is interesting to note the DMN acting, once again, as a sort of bridge between two
modes of processing. Inferentially speaking, one can speculate that PTSD would potentially
prevent this type of processing from occurring, resulting in further challenges with prolonged
creative problem solving or making important decisions. Another question of interest would be
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whether this process becomes distorted or simply interrupted. How would that manifest
behaviorally?
Findings from studies have been consistent throughout different cultures thus far. It
would be interesting if future studies investigated cultural variations in DMN functioning. Based
on extant literature, it would seem that these variations would be slight. There seems to be a
normative developmental trajectory in regard to the DMN and evolving self-social abilities. This
trend suggests that humans are all related through this neural network. Further research in this
area could include potential subtle differences in cultural adaptation to trauma and how such
differences maybe reflected subjectively. Similarities and differences may then shed light on
ideal DMN states that may be more resilient to trauma. The cognitive reserve hypothesis may
also be an interesting avenue to explore in relation to DMN integrity and resilience. It would
seem logical that an individual that grew up in a highly enriched environment may be able to
withstand traumatic experiences better than individuals who have not had the privilege of such
an environment as children.
Further along the cultural continuum, there lies a necessity for humans to construct
meaning and develop a sense of individuality: a long-held Western value. Given the emergence
of the self from social experiences and the subsequent layering of self and social processes, could
a deeper scientific understanding of the DMN contribute to inner values? In this light, it may not
be so much about finding uniqueness in independence as it is about finding individuality through
being related.
From a neurobiological model, morally inconsistent behaviors made by attachment
figures early in life become embedded in neural networks, resulting in the adoption of conflicting
moral models. It would seem that this internalization could lead to moral injury, as conflicting
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signals compete. It would be also interesting to explore moral injury in the context of conflicts
experienced when societal and individual values are opposed to each other.
As mentioned earlier, the dependence of self and social processes may also shed light on
certain psychodynamic principles. Concepts such as projection, transference, countertransference
and free association are well-known in psychodynamic theory, but have yet to be rooted in
science. Understanding how the DMN may be related to such experiences will contribute greatly
to psychological science.
The study of how PTSD impacts the DMN has provided a deeper understanding of the
human condition. It sheds light on the nature of self, relationships, morality, and how
psychological processes can be deconstructed and reconstructed through biopsychosocial
experiences. The benefits thereof, evident throughout this study, extend across the domains of
education, conceptualization, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment.
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